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XII. TORTS
The Corporate Libel Plaintiff
Defamation, which includes the torts of libel and slander, is an inva-
sion of the interest in reputation and good name.1 The status of a plain-
tiff in a defamation action determines the plaintiffs burden of proof and
often the results of the trial.2 The Supreme Court requires public of-
ficials' and public figures4 to prove "actual malice" in order to recover
damages for defamation.' Actual malice is the defendant's knowing or
reckless disregard of the falsity of the statement." If the plaintiff is a
' See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 737 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. Libel is written defamation and slander is oral defamation.
Id. The defamation must be communicated to a third person and must be of such a character
to be capable of affecting the opinion which others in the community may have of the plain-
tiff. Id Defamation affects the plaintiffs reputation, and, therefore, the plaintiffs own
humiliation or anger cannot establish the existence of defamation. Id
I See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); note 5 in-
fra.
, The Supreme Court has defined a "public official" as a government employee who
has, or appears to the public to have, "substantial responsibility" over government affairs.
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (supervisor of community-owned recreation area
held public official); see Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964) (elected District At-
torney); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (elected Commissioner of
Public Affairs); text accompanying notes 25-29 infra.
A public figure is someone who is prominent in society and who invites attention
and comment. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134 (1979) (research scientist not
public figure); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979 (private citizen
indicted by grand jury sixteen years before alleged libel not public figure); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (defense attorney not public figure); Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967) (college athletic director public figure); text accompany-
ing notes 30-44 infra.
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The actual malice
standard is an "almost insuperable" burden on a plaintiff. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's,
442 F. Supp. 1341, 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The Supreme Court's
actual malice standard is different from the defendant's ill will, spite, or hostility. In com-
mon law actions, the plaintiff has to prove the ill will type of malice to receive punitive
damages. See PROSSER, supra note 1, § 115, at 794-95. The term "actual malice" has caused
much confusion in the lower courts. See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler,
398 U.S. 6, 10 (1970) (actual malice is not "spite, hostility or deliberate intention to harm");
Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82 (1967) (per curiam) ("bad or corrupt
motive" is erroneous interpretation of actual malice); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357
(1965) (per curiam) (actual malice is intent to inflict harm through falsehood, not merely an
attempt to inflict harm); Rosen, Media Lament- The Rise and Fall of Involuntary Public
Figures, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 487, 490 n.19 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Rosen]. To prove ac-
tual malice, the public figure plaintiff must prove that the defendant in fact "entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731
(1968). The plaintiff must prove actual malice with "convincing clarity." New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86.
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private figure, however, he has only the common law burden of proving
that libelous words were actually published! The actual malice burden
of proof for public officials and public figures is greater than the common
law burden because the Supreme Court intended to protect the freedom
of the press to engage in uninhibited discussion of public issues.' The
public official and public figure are given less protection because they
have thrust themselves into the public eye. 9 In balancing individual
privacy with freedom of the press, the Supreme Court's opinions have
focused on the status of natural persons as plaintiffs. Neither the
Supreme Court nor any circuit court of appeals has determined to what
degree the public official and public figure standards that have evolved
for natural persons are applicable to corporate plaintiffs."0 The Fourth
Circuit recently had the opportunity to confront the issue in Artic Co. v.
Loudoun Times Mirror." The Artic Co. court, however, failed to consider
the unique characteristics of corporate libel plaintiffs. 2 Directly apply-
ing both the public official and public figure tests, the Artic Co. court
determined that the plaintiff corporation was a "private business enter-
prise" subject to the same standard of proof as a natural private person
at common law. i"
The plaintiff Artic Company, trading as Iroquois Research Institute
See PROSSER, supra note 1, § 111, at 744. At common law, the plaintiff's prima facie
case is made out in a defamation action when he has established that the defendant is
responsible for a publication of an actionable defamation to a third person who understood
the defamatory meaning. Id. § 114 at 776. In Virginia, for example, "[aill words shall be ac-
tionable which from their usual construction and common acceptance are construed as in-
sults and tend to violence and breach of the peace." VA CODE § 8.01-45 (1977). Publishers of
false and defamatory statements are liable at common law for damages incurred by the
plaintiff. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). Due to a legal presump-
tion that injury normally flows from the fact of publication, the plaintiff automatically
receives damages. See 418 U.S. at 350. The defendant has only the narrow defenses of truth
of the publication or privilege. See id at 372 (White, J., dissenting); PROSSER, supra note 1, §
114, at 766; Note, Defamation: Conflict in the Definition of "Public Figure," 10 SETON HALL
L. REV. 822, 827 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Defamation]. The defense of privilege is
available to those involved in judicial or legislative proceedings, certain executive officers of
the government, and husband and wife. See PROSSER, supra note 1, § 114 at 776-85.
' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 269, 279-80. In New York Times, the
Supreme Court found that the common law defense of truth was insufficient to protect the
freedom of expression. Id. at 279. Self-censorship was often the result under the common
law because the publisher had to guarantee the truth of the printed assertions to escape
liability. See id. The New York Times Court held that the constitutional guarantees of the
first amendment generally outweighed the privacy of a public official. Id. at 279-80; see
Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond:
An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1366 (1975).
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
10 See 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1287 (1978).
11 624 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3487 (Jan. 13, 1981) (No.
80-521).
22 See text accompanying notes 45-55 infra.
13 624 F.2d at 521.
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(Iroquois), is a corporation engaged in historical and archeological
research.14 The Fairfax County (Virginia) Water Authority hired Iro-
quois to evaluate and devise a plan to preserve the historical resources
in the area of proposed water intake facilities. 5 Since the area of the pro-
ject was already the subject of a considerable rezoning controversy,"6
the Loudoun Times Mirror (Mirror) assigned a reporter to write a story
on the archeological explorations in the area. Although Iroquois had con-
ducted numerous similar research projects, the Mirror reporter first
learned of Iroquois only after he had begun to investigate. 7 Mirror
published an article which Iroquois claimed contained libelous state-
ments.'8 Iroquois brought suit in federal district court against Mirror for
damage to its professional reputation.19 The trial court found that,
although Iroquois was not a public figure, it was a public official and
therefore required to prove the defendant's actual malice." The trial
court then granted summary judgment because the court found no genu-
" Id. at 519.
"5 Id. The Water Authority sought a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers to con-
struct water intake facilities on the Potomac River. Id. The permit required an inventory
for all archeological, historical, and architectural resources and a plan to preserve those
resources. Id.
"6 Id. The Fourth Circuit observed that the area of the water intake facilities, Lowes
Island, is an area of historical and archeological value. Id. The zoning conflict arose due to
the impending acquisition of a large part of the island by a developer and his attempts to
rezone the land for commercial use. Id. Other developers, citizens of the area, and history
enthusiasts were involved in the continuing rezoning controversy. Id. The Fourth Circuit
found that the rezoning controversy was the principal issue in the area and was unrelated to
Iroquois' activities. Id. at 522.
" Id. at 519. Iroquois worked for the Water Authority for only six months. Id. The
Fourth Circuit found that this fact indicated that Iroquois played a minor role in the govern-
ment project. Id. at 521-22. During the six month period, Iroquois was working on twenty
similar projects in seven states. Id. at 519. Although Iroquois may have been unknown in
Fairfax County, its corporate activities in the county could have affected the other projects.
Public scrutiny of a corporation may be warranted regardless of the size of the corporation
or of the interested public. See Note, In Search of the Corporate Private Figure: Defama-
tion of the Corporation, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 339, 355 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Corporate
Private Figures]; text accompanying notes 46-49 infra.
624 F.2d at 519. The Mirror published an article containing statements allegedly
made by R. E. McDaniel, an amateur archeologist. Id- McDaniel had experience in ar-
cheological exploration on Lowes Island and was known in the community as an authority
on the history of the island. Id. The Mirror article quoted McDaniel as criticizing Iroquois'
settlement plan and claiming that Iroquois did not have a good reputation in archeological
circles because Iroquois "cut[s] corners." Id. at 520.
" 624 F.2d at 519. Iroquois brought the suit against the Loudoun Times Mirror (Mir-
ror), a newspaper published in Loudoun County, Virginia; Carl Parks, a Mirror reporter;
and R.E. McDaniel, an amateur archeologist. Id. Parks wrote the article that contained the
allegedly libelous statement made by McDaniel, and Mirror published the article. Id. Iro-
quois sued in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Id at
518.
SId. at 520. The trial court found that Iroquois was not generally known in the com-
munity and did not inject itself into the Lowes Island controversy. Id- at 521.
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ine issue of material fact concerning actual malice on the part of the
defendant.2
On appeal, Iroquois contended that summary judgment was inap-
propriate because Iroquois was neither a public official nor a public
figure and could not be required to prove actual malice.22 The Fourth Cir-
cuit agreed with the trial court that Iroquois was not a public figure, but
further determined that Iroquois was not a public official.' Instead, the
Artic Co. court held Iroquois to the same burden of proof in a libel action
as a natural private person. 4
To decide whether Iroquois was a public official, the Fourth Circuit
applied the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Rosenblatt v.
Baer.25 Rosenblatt defined public bfficials as those government
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial respon-
sibility for government affairs. 6 The Fourth Circuit found that Iroquois
had been employed by the Water Authority for only six months and had
no control over governmental affairs. The Artic Co. court determined
that Iroquois made no recommendations, participated in no policy deter-
minations, and exercised no discretionary power over public business.'
The fact that the reporter had never heard of Iroquois before he began
21 Id. at 520. A court may grant summary judgment upon a showing by the moving party
that there is not genuine issue of any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Courts often grant summary judgments
in political libel cases. See, e.g., Schuster v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 602 F.2d 850,
855 (8th Cir. 1979); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947,
954 (D.D.C. 1976) (summary judgment prevents all but strongest libel cases from proceeding
to trial); Note, The Role of Summary Judgment in Political Libel Cases, 52 S. CAL. L. REV.
1783, 1794-95 (1979).
624 F.2d at 520. Iroquois contended that summary judgment was inappropriate
because there were material issues of fact concerning the reporter's doubts of the
truthfulness of the story. Id. Proof that the defendant entertained doubts about the veracity
of facts is evidence of actual malice. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968).
The Fourth Circuit did not reach the issue of malice in Artic Co. because the court held that
Iroquois was a private person for purposes of libel litigation and, therefore, was not re-
quired to prove malice. 624 F.2d at 521.
Id. at 522.
24 Id. at 521. On remand, Iroquois must establish its libel case under Virginia law. See
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,347 (1974). The Virginia Supreme Court has refused
to consider what standard should establish liability for actual damages in private individual
libel cases. Newspaper Publishing Corp. v. Burke, 216 Va. 800, 804-05, 224 S.E.2d 132, 135-36
(1976). The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia found that the
proper standard for private figure plaintiffs in Virginia is negligence, rather than actual
malice. Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F. Supp. 1005, 1011-12 (W.D. Va. 1979).
624 F.2d at 521 (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966)).
383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). The plaintiff in Rosenblatt was the supervisor of a recreation
area which was owned and operated by a county. Id. at 77. The Court remanded the decision
to determine whether the plaintiff's management role was so prominent that the public
regarded the plaintiff as chargeable with the failures and as credited with the successes of
the recreation area. Id. at 87-88.
'7 624 F.2d at 521-22.
1981]
720 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
investigating indicated to the Fourth Circuit that Iroquois did not ap-
pear to the public to have governing power." The Fourth Circuit cor-
rectly found that Iroquois was not a public official. Iroquois clearly did
not have either the substantial or apparent control over public policy
mandated by Rosenblatt. Rosenblatt requires that the public official
hold a position "in government," a term which has been applied only to
those persons holding public office. 9
Even though not classified as a public official, Iroquois still would be
held to the actual malice standard if it were found to be a public figure.
3
1
Public figures are "intimately involved in the resolution of important
public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of con-
cern to society at large."31 A public figure may be one of two types. An
SId. Rosenblatt balanced the values of individual privacy with those of open debate
by requiring proof that the official's position in government provokes an independent public
interest in the plaintiff's official position beyond the general public interest in governmental
affairs. 383 U.S. at 86. The employee's position must be so important as to invite public
scrutiny and discussion of the person holding that position even without the particular
charges currently in controversy. Id. at 86-87, 87 n.13.
' 383 U.S. at 86. Cases concerning the status of a plaintiff as a public official involve
either persons holding elected offices or candidates for public office. See St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 728 (1968) (candidate for public office); Beckley Newspapers Corp.
v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 81 (1967) (elected clerk of court); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,
64-65 (1964) (elected District Attorney); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256
(1964) (elected Commissioner of Public Affairs); Note, A Constitutional Revolution in the
Law of LibeL" New York Times and Gertz Applied, 11 TEX. TECH. U.L. REV. 611, 618 (1980).
The plaintiff in Rosenblatt was an employee of the county government. Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 77 (1966). The plaintiff had held the position of supervisor of a recreation area
for several years. See 383 U.S. at 77-78. All the Supreme Court public official cases have
concerned full-time governmental positions held for over one year. See, e.g., Beckley
Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 81 (1967) (plaintiff running for reelection as Clerk
of Court); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 77 (1966). Iroquois, however, contracted to work
for the Water Authority for only six months and was working on twenty other projects for
private business during the period. 624 F.2d at 519.
The Supreme Court broadened the first amendment protections of New York Times
by requiring public figures as well as public officials to prove actual malice. Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); see notes 2-4 supra.
"' Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163-64 (1967). Whether or not the
burden of proving actual malice will be placed on the plaintiff depends upon the status of
the plaintiff. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974). The determination
whether to apply the actual malice standard had been based on the nature of the contro-
versy that led to the libel. The Supreme Court extended the New York Times rule to any
statement concerning an issue of "public or general interest," whether the statement in-
volved a public or private person. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43
(1971). Gertz overruled Rosenbloom's focus on the subject matter of the alleged defamation
and returned the focus to the status of the plaintiff. 418 U.S. at 351; 418 U.S. 353 (Blackmun,
J., concurring). Gertz, however, did not entirely eliminate the issue-based inquiry of
Rosenbloom. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947,
956 (D.D.C. 1976); Defamation, supra note 7, at 842-43. Gertz established that in order for
the plaintiff to be a public figure, a public controversy must exist. 418 U.S. at 345. The in-
dividual may become involved either voluntarily or involuntarily, but must attempt to
[Vol. XXXVIII
FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
"all-purpose" public figure has achieved such fame or notoriety that he
has influence on a broad range of issues 2 The more common of the two
types is a "limited" public figure, who voluntarily injects himself or is
drawn into a particular controversy.' Since either figure assumes
special prominence in the resolution of public questions, both receive
less first amendment protection because of their widespread fame or in-
tentional pursuit of public attention.' A public figure needs less protec-
tion than a private person because a public figure has greater access to
the media and is in a better position to present his side of an issue.
3 5
The Supreme Court recently considered a public-figure case which,
like Artic Co., involved technical services provided to the government.
In Hutchinson v. Proxmire,8 the Court found that a research scientist
was not a public figure, although he had voluntarily applied for govern-
ment funds and had published numerous articles in scholarly journals.
37
The Hutchinson Court stated that the test of a plaintiff's access to the
media could only be satisfied by proof of media access prior to the
defamation. 8 Moreover, the Court noted that persons charged with
defamation cannot create their own defense by making a public figure
out of a previously private individual.3 9 Mere concern about general
public expenditures, although shared by most of the public, does not
make every recipient of public grants a public figure."
Iroquois' relationship to public controversy was similar to that of the
research scientist in Hutchinson. The Fourth Circuit found that Iroquois
did not thrust itself into the public rezoning controversy.4 Both Iroquois
assume special prominence in the resolution of the issues within the controversy. Id. The
trial court must first determine whether or not a public controversy exists, and then
whether the controversy is sufficiently newsworthy to merit protection of the press. See
Defamation, supra note 7, at 843.
32 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
3 Id.
Id. at 342; see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976). In Firestone, a Palm
Beach socialite was held not to be a public figure although her divorce, from which the alleged
libel arose was a "cause eelebre." 424 U.S. at 454-55. A "public controversy" for purposes of
determining the actual malice burden is not merely any controversy of interest to the
public. Id. at 545. The Firestone divorce proceeding was not a public question, and Mrs.
Firestone did not thrust herself into the public limelight. Instead, she was compelled to go
to court. Id at 454.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
443 U.S. 111 (1979). In Hutchinson, a research scientist funded by the federal govern-
ment received a "Golden Fleece Award" and sued the donor, United States Senator William
Proxmire, for libel. Id. at 114. The Senator initiated the award to publicize what he thought
to be the most flagrant examples of wasteful government spending. Id.
Id at 135-36.
Id. at 136. The Supreme Court found that the scientist's published writings reached
a relatively small category of professionals and were of no interest to the general public
before Proxmire's award. Id. at 135.
29 Id.
40 Id See also Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166-67 (1979).
41 624 F.2d at 521.
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and Hutchinson performed limited professional services in highly
technical fields,42 and both were generally unknown before the libel."3
Neither Iroquois nor Hutchinson had any control over government
policy."' The two cases differ, however, because Iroquois is a corporation.
Corporations, like natural persons, have reputations to protect.
45
Unlike natural persons, however, corporations have no reputations in
the personal sense.46 To ensure their economic survival, corporations
consciously thrust themselves into the public view and directly compete
for public attention. 7 Moreover, corporations are creations of the state,
and the state provides corporations with legal benefits unavailable to a
natural person. 8 Since a corporation receives special benefits and volun-
tarily enters the business world, the public has a legitimate interest in
all corporate activities.49 If corporate libel plaintiffs are not required to
prove actual malice, the public's right to information may be hampered
42 I&
" See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135-36 (1979); Artic Co. v. Loudoun Times
Mirror, 624 F.2d 518, 521-22 (4th Cir. 1980). Neither Hutchinson nor Iroquois deliberately
planned to attract public attention to influence a public issue or to sway public sentiment in
its favor. 443 U.S. at 135-36; 624 F.2d at 521-22; see Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443
U.S. 157, 168 (1979).
See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 135; Artic Co., 624 F.2d at 521-22.
's See PROSSER, supra note 1, § 111 at 745.
48 A person is protected from libel because of "the essential dignity and worth of every
human being." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)). Corporations, as creations of the state,
do not possess this essential human quality. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star
Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 955 (D.D.C. 1976). Corporations, however, are considered
persons for certain legal purposes. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 561 (1819). A corporation has no private life to protect and cannot ex-
perience pain and suffering. See Copley v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 93,
95 (S.D. W. Va. 1968). Although a corporation can develop trade secrets, these secrets are
protected by the law of unfair competition and do not need further safeguards of a relaxed
libel standard. See 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1287, 1299 (1978). Under varying state laws, a cor-
poration can bring an action for libel based only on words which negatively reflect upon its
trade, business ethics, or financial soundness. See Golden Palace, Inc. v. NBC, Inc., 386 F.
Supp. 107, 109 (D.D.C. 1974); Interstate Optical Co. v. Illinois State Soc'y of Optometrists,
244 Ill. App. 158, 162 (1927); Finnish Temperance Soc'y Sovittaja v. Finnish Socialistic
Publishing Co., 238 Mass. 345, -, 130 N.E. 845, 847 (1921); Bee Publishing Co. v. World
Publishing Co., 59 Neb. 713, _ ,82 N.W. 28, 29 (1900); Reporters' Ass'n of America v. Sun
Printing and Publishing Ass'n, 186 N.Y. 437, 439, 79 N.E. 710, 711 (1906).
" See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 955
(D.D.C. 1976); Corporate Private Figure, supra note 17, at 354.
"8 See J. PHELAN & R. POZEN, THE COMPANY STATE 5 (1973). A corporation enjoys
privileges such as special tax rates, the ability to raise capital by issuing stock, centralized
management, limited liability of the owners, and perpetual life. Id.
"9 See Corporate Private Figure, supra note 17, at 354. A free press should investigate
corporate affairs to alert the public to potential harm and to identify persons who abuse the
public trust. Id. at 355. The right of the press to investigate applies to all corporations, even
closely held "morn and pop" businesses. The activities of a small corporation affect the
public, although only a small portion of the public. Id
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because the lesser common law burden of proof may chill the exercise of
public discussion." Small, unknown corporations, however, may have lit-
tle media access because of their limited resources and size, and may be
vulnerable to false statements. Therefore, some corporations, like Iro-
quois, can be private status plaintiffs.51
Since the Supreme Court had not yet determined the burden of proof
required of corporate libel plaintiffs, the lower federal courts have at-
tempted to balance first amendment guarantees against the interest of
the states in protecting corporate reputation. Federal district courts are
in conflict over the appropriate weight to be given to the competing in-
terests.2 Corporations that are large, well-known and influential clearly
qualify as public figures. 3 Conversely, small corporations could be con-
sidered private figures if they are involved in areas not generally of
public concern and if they are not influential in public policy. 4 The dif-
ficulty of applying the public figure tests is greatest in cases of corpora-
tions which are not generally known by the public and are involved in
limited-issue controversies. To determine whether a corporation is a
public figure, courts should consider the size of the corporation, the cor-
poration's share of the industry in which it competes, the extent of
I Id. If a corporate plaintiff is designated a private figure, the press is exposed to
liability for negligent misstatements. Id. at 355-56; see note 24 supra. The threat of liability
may result in the self-censorship of the press that New York Times sought to avoid. See
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 341 (1974); Corporate Private Figure, supra note 17, at
356.
See Corporate Private Figure, supra note 17, at 352-53.
Compare Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1347-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
and Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 819-20 (N.D. Cal.
1977) with Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 956
(D.D.C. 1976). The district court in Martin Marietta ruled that the Gertz safeguards of
privacy apply only to natural persons since corporations do not possess private lives. 417 F.
Supp. at 954-55. Martin Marietta, therefore, denies corporations full protection from libel.
Id. at 955. By its terms, Gertz protects only "human beings" from libel under New York
Times. 418 U.S. at 341. The district court in Trans World, however, applied the public
figure test to a corporate plaintiff without distinction from a natural person. 425 F. Supp. at
819. The Trans World court found that the distinctions between corporations and natural
persons are unimportant and disagreed with Martin Marietta's proposal to return to the
overruled Rosenbloom subject matter test in cases involving corporate plaintiffs. Id.; see
417 F. Supp. at 956. The public interest in an issue, not the size of a corporation, would
determine whether the corporation should bear the burden of actual malice. See Corporate
Private Figure, supra note 17, at 359-60; 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1287, 1300 (1978). The Trans
World court, however, found that the Supreme Court in Gertz had rejected Rosenbloom
without qualification. 425 F. Supp. at 819; see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 346.
Reliance Insurance followed the reasoning of Trans World and found no difference between
corporate and natural person libel plaintiffs. 442 F. Supp. at 1347-48.
' See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 957
(D.D.C. 1976). The district court found the Martin Marietta Corp. to be a public figure
because the corporation had attempted to expand its position of influence as the nation's
twentieth largest defense contractor by hosting private outings for Pentagon officials. Id.
' See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
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governmental regulation in the industry, and the extent to which the
corporation's shares are traded on public exchanges.55
In Artic Co., the Fourth Circuit directly applied the public official
and public figure standards to Iroquois. The Artic Co. court formulated
no special analysis of the standards even though Iroquois was a corpora-
tion. The case was decided correctly on the facts, however, because Iro-
quois did not hold a position of public authority and should not be re-
quired to prove actual malice. Since the court did not consider special
standards to be applied to corporate plaintiffs to determine when a cor-
poration is a public figure, Artic Co. should be limited to its facts and
should not be read as holding that corporations and natural persons are
subject to the same status tests in defamation actions.
JEFFREY C. PALKOVITZ
See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Corpora-
tions are regulated not only in product areas, but also in the trading of their securities. Id
Either the corporation's production and services or its investment activities may thrust the
corporate plaintiff into positions of influence and public discussion in an area which is not
the subject of the corporation's instant libel litigation. Id
